Introduction
In this paper, we study the leader election problem in the full information model. We show two results in this context. First, we exhibit a constructive O(log N) round protocol that is resilient against linear size coalitions.
That is, our protocol is resilient against any coalition of size less then~N for some constant (but small) value of~. Second, we provide an easy, non-constructive probabilistic argument that shows the existence of an O(log N) round protocol in which~can be made as large as + -e for any positive 6. Our protocols are extremely simple.
Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advanta~e, the ACM copyright notice and the title of the publication and Its date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the Association of Computing Machinery. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and/or specific permission.
STOC 94-5/94 Montreal, Quebec, Canada @ 1994 ACM 0-89791 -663-8/84/0005..$3.50 A central problem in distributed computing is that of generating a common coin or, equivalently, of electing a leader. We consider this problem in the setting where there is a coalition of malicious players who are trying to maximize the chances of one of them being elected as a leader. A protocol, on the other hand must guarantee that there is a reasonable chance that an honest player will be elected regardless of any devious plot hatched by the coalition. This problem has been extensively studied in the cryptographic setting, culminating in the constant expected time Byzantine Agreement algorithm of Feldman and Micali .
In this paper, we consider this question in the full-information model introduced by . This model is characterized by the following two "worst case" assumptions. resulted in proof of the existence of a protocol that has optimal immunity (any P < + -6 for any positive E).
We measure efficiency in terms of the number Each walk is a committee.
3Alternately, one could elect a leader in C recursively.
In reality, we need to do two iterations of committee selection before we exit using the Alon-Naor protocol. This is because the Alon-Naor is constructed using an exponen- It is instructive to consider the fcdlowing alternative committee construction methc)d. Each committee is a random subset of size p of players. As we increase the size p the probability of a committee being a dangerous one decreases exponentially. This is the effect we wish to simulate via the expander construction. We replace the expander based construction of committees with a random construct ion to obtain the non-constructive result.
The difference between the two constructions is simply that while in the first case, increasing p automatically increases the number M of committees, p and M are independent in the second. Thus, the crucial ratio T 10 B log c is fixed for the expander construction but can e made arbitrarily small in the random case. As will be evident from the analysis, it is this ratio that determines the fraction of dishonest players that our protocol can tolerate.
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The proof
In this section we will address the two issues that arise in proving the main theorem in this paper.
We first address the easier issue, and show that the protocol runs in O(log IV) rounds, Then, we address the main issue, that of showing that the protocol described here has the required immunity.
Rounds
Consider an arbitrary committee C' G C. The probability that C' is eliminated in an arbitrary round i is at least the probability that C is eliminated by one of the votes cast by the honest players. With probability 1 -~, the protocol completes in fewer than~rounds.
Proof: By substituting~for i in the preceding discussion and applying Markov's inequality. votes cast by honest players. Thus, the probability that C is not eliminated in the ith round is at most
-(1-8). Therefore, the probability that C is not eliminated in rounds 1 through is e-(l-~)~.
Thus, we get E (Igl rl I?l) s e-t(l-@ IZ?I
If we apply Markov's inequality and substitute the value of -1we obtain the lemma. is an O(log N) round leader election protocol that is @immune for every~smaller than a fixed constant. 
Finally, we notice that if~is small enough, then such an 1 exists. The largest possible value of /3 is easily computed as the solution the equation Here, the probability is taken over It is now easily seen that by choosing the value of A = 4/5, the root of the equation 
